For more than forty years, the whole matter remained the subject of large-scale speculation. Films such as Raoul Peck's Lumumba kept asking the same questions over and over again: Who killed Lumumba? How did he die? Who knew about it and who helped to accomplish such a cruel feat?
These are the questions that author Stephen Weissman has undertaken to answer for us. Weissman was staff director of the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa from 1986 to 1991. He himself had already taken notice of the failings of the US government in matters of foreign policy in a book entitled "A Culture of Deference: Congress's Failure of Leadership in Foreign Policy" published by Basic Boosk in 1996. The question of the death of Lumumba seems to have been bugging him for some time now.
In an article published in the Washington Post on Sunday, July 21, 2002, Weissman reveals what he calls "U.S. involvement in -- and significant responsibility for -- the death of Lumumba, who was mistakenly seen by the Eisenhower administration as an African Fidel Castro."
He adds: "The conventional explanation of Lumumba's death has been that he was murdered by Congolese rivals after earlier U.S. attempts to kill him, including a plot to inject toxins into his food or toothpaste, failed. In 1975, the U.S. Senate's "Church Committee" probed CIA assassination plots and concluded there was "no evidence of CIA involvement in bringing about the death of Lumumba."
Not so, Weissman adamantly concludes. The 41 year-old lie has just been what it was, a big lie. Weissman believes the role of the US was much more profound than that. He bases his allegations on classifieds US government documents that he claims to have obtained. According to Weissman, these documents clearly show that "the key Congolese leaders who brought about Lumumba's downfall were players in "Project Wizard," a CIA covert action program. Hundreds of thousands of dollars and military equipment were channeled to these officials, who informed their CIA paymasters three days in advance of their plan to send Lumumba into the clutches of his worst enemies."
But that was not all: "Other new details: The U.S. authorized payments to then-President Joseph Kasavubu four days before he ousted Lumumba, furnished Army strongman Mobutu with money and arms to fight pro-Lumumba forces, helped select and finance an anti-Lumumba government, and barely three weeks after his death authorized new funds for the people who arranged Lumumba's murder," Weissman adds.
Using both CIA and Belgian sources, including the one-thousand-page report issued in February of this year by the Belgian government partially acknowledging Belgian responsibility in the events that led to the demise of Lumumba, Weissman offers a chronology that leaves no doubt as to what role the US governement played in the matter:
August 1960: "the CIA established Project Wizard. Congo had been independent only a month, and Lumumba, a passionate nationalist, had become prime minister, with a plurality of seats in the parliament. But U.S. presidential candidate John F. Kennedy was vowing to meet "the communist challenge" and Eisenhower's NSC was worried that Lumumba would tilt toward the Soviets."
September 1, 1960: "the NSC's Special Group authorized CIA payments to Kasavubu, the U.S. documents say. On Sept. 5, Kasavubu fired Lumumba in a decree of dubious legality. However, Kasavubu and his new prime minister, Ileo, proved lethargic over the following week as Lumumba rallied supporters. So Mobutu seized power on Sept. 14. He kept Kasavubu as president and established a temporary "College of Commissioners" to replace the disbanded government."
Also, still in September 1960, Weissman adds, "The CIA financed the College and influenced the selection of commissioners. The College was dominated by two Project Wizard participants: Bomboko, its president, and Ndele, its vice-president. Another CIA ally, Lumumba party dissident Victor Nendaka, was appointed chief of the security police".
October 27, 1960: "the NSC Special Group approved $250,000 for the CIA to win parliamentary support for a Mobutu government. However, when legislators balked at approving any prime minister other than Lumumba, the parliament remained closed. The CIA money went to Mobutu personally and the commissioners."
November 20, 1960: "the Special Group authorized the CIA to provide arms, ammunition, sabotage materials and training to Mobutu's military in the event it had to resist pro-Lumumba forces."
September/October/November 1960: "After being ousted Sept. 5, Lumumba rallied support in parliament and the international community. When Mobutu took over, U.N. troops protected Lumumba, but soon confined him to his residence. Lumumba escaped on Nov. 27. Days later he was captured by Mobutu's troops, beaten and arrested."
December 1960: "As early as Christmas Eve 1960, College of Commissioners' president Bomboko offered to hand Lumumba over to two secessionist leaders who had vowed to kill him. One declined and nothing happened until mid-January 1961, when the central government's political and military position deteriorated and troops guarding Lumumba (then jailed on a military base near the capital) mutinied. CIA and other Western officials feared a Lumumba comeback."
January 14, 1961: "the commissioners asked Kasavubu to move Lumumba to a "surer place." There was "no doubt," the Belgian inquiry concluded, that Mobutu agreed. Kasavubu told security chief Nendaka to transfer Lumumba to one of the secessionist strongholds"
January 17, 1961: "Nendaka sent Lumumba to the Katanga region. That night, Lumumba and two colleagues were tortured and executed in the presence of members of the Katangan government. No official announcement was made for four weeks."
February 11, 1961: "with U.S. reports from Congo strongly indicating Lumumba was dead, the Special Group authorized $500,000 for political action, troop payments and military equipment, largely to the people who had arranged Lumumba's murder."
Such are the key dates that, according to Weissman, irrefutably link the U.S. to one of the most sombre episodes of the Cold War era, a link that, once again, reveals how much of Africa's destiny was controlled from outside by the governments of Europe as well as by the U.S. as they sought to combat the Soviets and the communist plague all over the world.
Weissman's article thus comes to ease the mystery over this whole affair. Lumumba was indeed savagely assassinated by fellow Africans who had been manipulated into doing so by both the US and the Belgian governments who feared that Mulumba would go "red". The Eisenhower fears of seing Lummumba go communist were thus real enough for the US administration to grant U.S. military and financial support to those Congolese leaders who were not only going to get their bloody revenge over Lumumba, but also to plunge to country into a chaotic whose consequences are still felt today as the country battles a civil war that feeds on the disasters caused by the Mobutu regime that the CIA is believed to have supported throughout the years.Weissman believes that now that the truth is out, it is now up to the U.S. governement to fully acknowlegde its responsibility in the 41-year old Congolese debacle and consider the kinds of amends that would be necessary if true reparations for the misdeeds of the past are to be offered. For only then will the healing process truly begin in a Congo still faced with multifarous and intricate ills. "These facts are four decades old, but are worth unearthing for two reasons. First, Congo (known for years as Zaire) is still struggling to establish democracy and stability. By facing up to its past role in undermining Congo's fledgling democracy, the United States might yet contribute to Congo's future", Weissman writes.
The U.S. is indeed the only remaining country in the world with the kind of financial and political influence that could help countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo redress themselves. A true commitment to peace and development in the Congo of Kabila could thus bring new hopes and suggest new directions for the failed partnership between Africa and the U.S.
With the bulk of Africa's human and material resources remaining largely untapped, now would be the time for a new deal, one that would be profitable to all without exception. Without a true U.S. commitment to democratic values abroad, Weissman concludes, there is risk of compromising those most fondamental principles that the U.S. so justly defends both at home and abroad.
Source: Washington Post. To view Weissman's full article, click here.
